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CONSTITUTIONAL CANARIES AND THE ELUSIVE QUEST TO LEGITIMIZE 
SECURITY DETENTIONS IN CANADA
Maureen T. Duffy & René Provost†
Canada, like many other countries, has struggled with questions of 
how to prevent terrorist attacks without undermining human rights. One 
tool that gained prominence in recent years involves preventive detention 
under “security certificates.” This measure, undertaken through immigra-
tion legislation, applies to non-citizens found inadmissible for one of a 
number of reasons, including a suspicion that they endanger national secu-
rity. Such detentions have ignited considerable controversy within Canada. 
In February 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada found the existing scheme 
unconstitutional. While the Court did not find the scheme to be discrimina-
tory, in spite of its application only to non-citizens, it did find that the poten-
tial use of secret evidence contravened procedural fairness. Canada subse-
quently passed legislation, creating a special advocate system. This article 
argues that continued problems exist with these detentions, including ques-
tions of discrimination and concerns about the fairness of the new special 
advocate system. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the days following the attacks of September 11, 2001, there were 
rumors that some of the hijackers entered the United States via Canada.1
The rumors, which proved entirely unfounded, contributed to a sense of 
urgency in Canada as to the need to radically tighten immigration controls 
and anti-terrorism measures.2 In line with new legislation in the United 
States and a significant number of other countries, Canada enacted statutes 
that facilitated the preventive detention of individuals suspected of conspir-
ing to commit terrorist attacks. The constitutionality of administrative de-
tention pursuant to “security certificates” in Canada was tested in a Febru-
ary 23, 2007 decision by the Supreme Court of Canada (Supreme Court). In 
Charkaoui v. Canada (Charkaoui), the Supreme Court issued a historic and 
unanimous ruling that found the security certificate scheme unconstitution-
al.3 The Charkaoui decision was one of several national high court deci-
sions issued around the world that addressed detention practices for those 
accused of some form of terrorist affiliation.4
As will be explained in greater detail below, a security certificate is 
an immigration order that is issued in certain cases, clearing the way for a 
non-citizen to be deported from Canada. Under the security certificate 
scheme, people can be detained, often for very long periods, particularly in 
those cases in which deportation cannot be easily accomplished—usually 
because of a claim that the person faces a risk of torture if deported. The 
standards and procedures for issuing security certificates vary considerably 
from those normally applied in criminal cases and also vary from those ap-
plied in typical immigration proceedings. Perhaps the biggest and most con-
troversial distinction is that security certificates can, in some circumstances, 
be issued based on evidence that the named person is never allowed to see. 
Security certificates may also place significant restrictions on judicial re-
view of the basis of a person’s detention. Although various situations can 
give rise to a security certificate proceeding, security certificates have been 
used primarily to detain those suspected of some sort of terrorism affiliation 
since September 11, 2001. 
1 See, e.g., Robert Pear, After the Attacks: The Northern Border, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 
2001, at A21. 
2 See, e.g., Doug Struck, Canada Fights Myth It Was 9/11 Conduit, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 
2005, at A20.  
3 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007 SCC 9, 
¶ 3 (Can.) [hereinafter Charkaoui]. 
4 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (United States); A (FC) and others 
(FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, X (FC) and another (FC) v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL  56, 2 A.C. 68 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(U.K.) [hereinafter Belmarsh Detainees]); Thomas v Mowbray (2007) H.C.A. 33 (Austl.), 
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2007/33.html.
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The Supreme Court considered security certificates in its Charkaoui
decision. Charkaoui involved three men—Adil Charkaoui, Hassan Almrei, 
and Mohamed Harkat—who had been detained under Canada’s security 
certificate provision.5 This article analyzes the Supreme Court’s ruling as 
well as legislation recently enacted in Canada to respond to that ruling. Sec-
tion II provides a factual background on the three litigants, as well as an 
explanation of the legal context in which the Supreme Court ruled. Section 
III focuses on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Charkaoui. Section IV de-
tails the response of the Government of Canada. Finally, Section V analyzes 
both the decision and the governmental response, explaining ongoing prob-
lems with security certificate proceedings. 
II. BACKGROUND ON THE CASES
A.  Factual Background 
Adil Charkaoui is a permanent resident of Canada,6 originally from 
Morocco. He has been living in Canada since 1995. Charkaoui was first 
arrested and detained in 2003 under a security certificate.7 Charkaoui was 
released under a condition of bail in 2005, after having been held for ap-
proximately two years, and without ever having been charged with any 
criminal offense. To this day, Charkaoui remains under constant monitoring 
by way of an electronic device that he must wear at all times, with his abili-
ty to travel and to communicate via telephone or internet significantly re-
stricted.8 Charkaoui maintains that he would be at risk of torture if he was 
deported to Morocco.9 Charkaoui has a wife and three children living with 
him in Montreal, where he teaches French and is working on a Ph.D. part 
time.10 Charkaoui has consistently denied any terrorism affiliations. Because 
much of the evidence being used against Charkaoui is considered classified, 
he and his attorneys have not been made privy to all of the evidence, instead 
5 See Charkaoui, supra note 3. For information on security certificates consult the Immi-
gration and Refugee Protection Act. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 
27, §§ 33, 77–85 (Can.) [hereinafter IRPA]. 
6 Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶ 10. 
7 Id.
8 See Charkaoui (Re), [2005] F.C. 248, ¶16 (Can.)[hereinafter Charkaoui (Re)].   
9 Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶ 15. See also Canada: Security Certificates — Time for 
Reform, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CANADA,  Feb. 14, 2006, http://www.amnesty.ca/take_ 
action/actions/canada_certificates.php [hereinafter Security Certificates]. 
10 Media Advisory: CSIS Under Scrutiny at Supreme Court for Destruction of Evidence in 
Security Certificate Case, COALITION JUSTICE FOR ADIL CHARKAOUI, Jan. 31, 2008, 
http://www.adilinfo.org/en/node/303 (explaining ongoing litigation brought by Charkaoui 
and giving background information on his life). 
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at times only being presented with summaries of the evidence that has been 
determined subject to disclosure to Charkaoui.11
Charkaoui has been vigorously protesting the security certificate in 
his case. For example, in addition to the Supreme Court case discussed 
herein, Charkaoui filed an additional challenge regarding the evidence the 
Government is using against him. Charkaoui challenged a late disclosure of 
allegedly “new” evidence that was submitted as part of the justification for 
his detention under a security certificate. Charkaoui also raised issues re-
garding the alleged destruction of some of the original evidence by the Ca-
nadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).12 In June 2008, the Supreme 
Court ruled that CSIS has a duty to maintain such evidence, and that sub-
mission of mere summaries of the evidence to the presiding judge does not 
meet the requirements of Section 7 of the Charter, although the Court left 
the determination as to any specific prejudice in this case to the judge hear-
ing the matter.13 It is notable, as well, that Charkaoui has filed a constitu-
tional challenge to the new Bill C-3—the legislation discussed in this ar-
ticle. That challenge is in a very early stage as of the writing of this article.14
The second individual whose security certificate was considered in 
Charkaoui, Mohamed Harkat, is a Convention refugee originally from Al-
geria, living in Canada as a foreign national.15 Harkat was arrested and de-
tained in 2002.16 In 2005, a judge of the Federal Court ruled that his security 
certificate was “reasonable.”17 In 2006, he was released on extensive bail 
conditions, restricting his movements, his ability to use the phone and inter-
net, and even his ability to remain unsupervised in his home, and he remains 
11 See generally Federal Judge Rejects Request to Lift Conditions on Adil Charkaoui,
CBC NEWS, Oct. 10, 2007, available at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/montreal
/story/2007/10/10/qc-charkaoui1010.html (explaining that Charkaoui’s release requires con-
ditions to protect national security); Charkaoui (Re), supra note 8, ¶ 86 (explaining the con-
ditions of Charkaoui’s release). 
12 Supreme Court of Canada, Case Summary of Adil Charkaoui v. Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration http://cases-dossiers.scc-csc.gc.ca/information/cms/case_summary_e.asp? 
31597 (last visited May 10, 2008) [hereinafter Summary: Adil Charkaoui]. 
13 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2008] 2008 SCC 38 ¶ 2, 18, 77 
(Can.)(noting that the obligation of submission of full evidence pertains to the ministers, who 
then must convey it to the judge). The judge retains the option of presenting only a summary 
of the evidence to the detainee upon the relevant findings of national-security concerns. The 
Court further clarified that it was not revisiting the issues raised in the first Charkaoui case, 
nor was it commenting on Bill C-3. Id. 
14 Charkaoui File: Legal Update and Overview, COALITION JUSTICE FOR ADIL CHARKAOUI,
http://www.adilinfo.org/en/taxonomy/term/18 (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) (containing regular 
updates to the extensive litigation Charkaoui is bringing on various issues).
15 See Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶ 10. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
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under those conditions today.18 Harkat has been advised that he will be de-
ported to Algeria, a decision he is challenging on the basis that he is at risk 
of torture if deported there.19 In late January 2008, Harkat was re-arrested 
on a government allegation that he had violated the terms of the conditions 
attached to his release, and he subsequently was re-released on conditions as 
the court considered the allegations.20
The third individual, Hassan Almrei, is also a Convention refugee, 
originally from Syria, who was living in Canada when he was arrested and 
detained in 2001.21 His security certificate was judicially determined to be 
“reasonable,” and he remains in detention to this day.22 Although initially 
slated to be deported to Syria, that deportation order was stayed, based on a 
determination that an original assessment, which had found that he was not 
at risk of torture, was flawed.23 The Supreme Court, in referring to Almrei’s 
detention, noted that Almrei does not know “when, if ever, he will be re-
leased.”24
B.  Security Certificates Under Canadian Law 
Canada has followed a trend, seen around the world, of using its 
immigration legislation to detain non-nationals suspected of terrorism in-
volvement. Security certificates involve a finding that a non-national is in-
admissible to Canada.25 The outcome, if a certificate is deemed reasonable, 
is generally deportation of the person in question.26
Specifically, security certificates are issued under Canada’s Immi-
gration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), which was enacted in late 2001 
and entered into force in early 2002.27 Prior to 2002, a special process ex-
18 See id. See also, Harkat v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [2006] FC 628, at 
60–62 (Can.) (listing the conditions of Harkat’s bail). 
19 Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶ 15; Security Certificates, supra note 9.  
20 Andrew Duffy, Jail Harkat, Seize $95,000, Lawyer Urges, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Feb.  
7, 2008, http://www.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id=52b9ee54-78d5-40c9-8bfb-
fc937059e81e.
21 Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶ 10. 
22 Id.
23 Security Certificates, supra note 9. 
24 Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶ 13. 
25 See IRPA, supra note 5, § 77. 
26 See id. §§ 80–82. 
27 Id. §§ 77–85. Canada has had security certificate processes in its immigration legisla-
tion, in varying forms, for many years. After September 11, 2001, however, when Canada 
significantly changed its immigration legislation— replacing the prior Immigration Act with 
the IRPA—it included amendments to its security certificate legislation that significantly 
reduced procedural safeguards for those accused of terrorism offenses. The security certifi-
cate practice, therefore, has gained considerable notoriety in Canada since September 11, 
2001, as it is now clearly used as a terrorism-prevention tool. John Ip, Transnational Law 
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isted for permanent residents for whom removal was sought on national 
security grounds.28 Such cases were held before the Security Intelligence 
Review Committee (SIRC) and included a number of procedural safe-
guards, including security-cleared lawyers and specified procedures for evi-
dence claimed to be classified.29 For foreign nationals who were not perma-
nent residents of Canada, there was a separate security certificate proceed-
ing, held before a federal judge.30 In 2002, there were significant changes to 
Canada’s immigration legislation including, among other things, elimination 
of the SIRC process for permanent residents.31 There have been suggestions 
that the IRPA improperly eliminated necessary procedural safeguards.32
Since the September 11th attacks, the Canadian security certificate system 
has come under considerable criticism.33
The relevant provision of the IRPA, considered by the Supreme 
Court in Charkaoui, provides: 
The Minister [of Citizenship and Immigration] and the Minister of Public 
Safety and Emergency Preparedness shall sign a certificate stating that a 
permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of se-
curity, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or orga-
nized criminality and refer it to the Federal Court, which shall make a de-
termination under section 80.34
and Contemporary Problems: Comparative Perspectives on the Detention of Terrorist Sus-
pects, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 773, 802–804 (2007).  See also Craig Forcese & 
Lorne Waldman, Seeking Justice in an Unfair Process: Lessons from Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and New Zealand on the Use of “Special Advocates” in National Security Pro-
ceedings, Aug. 2007, at 5–10, available at http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~cforcese/other/sastudy.pdf 
[hereinafter Forcese & Waldman]. 
28 Forcese & Waldman, supra note 27, at 5–6. 
29 Id. at iv, 6–7. 
30 Id. at 10. 
31 Id. at 10–11. 
32 Id. at 12. See also Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶¶ 70-77 (explaining the former SIRC 
process in the earlier version of Canada's immigration legislation, as well as other less-
restrictive means that Canada has used to weigh competing interests of fairness with the need 
to keep certain information confidential). 
33 See Forcese & Waldman, supra note 27, at 12. See also Sharryn J. Aiken & Andrew J. 
Brouwer, This Pen Is Too Mighty: Letter to Public Safety Minister Anne McLellan (Oct. 14, 
2004), http://www.justiceforharkat.com/e107_plugins/content/content.php?content.105. The 
Akin-Brouwer letter protests Canada’s detentions under security certificates, as well as the 
potential of deportation to torture. The letter is signed by Sharryn J. Aiken, Assistant Profes-
sor of Law, Queen’s University and Andrew J. Brouwer, Co-Chair, Legal Affairs Commit-
tee, Canadian Council for Refugees. The letter contains a long list of endorsements, includ-
ing, for instance, a large number of law professors across Canada, Amnesty International, the 
Canadian Bar Association, and the Criminal Lawyers Association. Id.  
34 IRPA, supra note 5, § 77. As will be discussed in more detail in the following sections, 
this provision was found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada, and new legisla-
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According to the Government of Canada, security certificates are 
employed when there is a need to use sensitive information that needs to be 
protected for reasons of national security or for the safety of any person.35
According to the IRPA, the purpose of the detention is to determine whether 
the person is admissible to Canada and, if not, whether that person should 
be deported.36
The Supreme Court has indicated that the security certificate regime 
was designed to handle “tension” between issues of procedural fairness in 
deportation proceedings and the need to protect the public from a threat of 
terrorism. Specifically, the Court noted that: 
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (“IRPA”) … 
attempts to resolve this tension in the immigration context by allowing the 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (the “Minister”), and the Minister 
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (collectively “the minis-
ters”) to issue a certificate of inadmissibility leading to the detention of a 
permanent resident or foreign national deemed to be a threat to national 
security.  The certificate and the detention are both subject to review by a 
judge, in a process that may deprive the person named in the certificate of 
some or all of the information on the basis of which the certificate was is-
sued or the detention ordered.37
The process is initiated when a Minister signs a certificate, finding 
that the permanent resident or foreign national is inadmissible into Canada. 
Where the person is already present within Canada, this certification trig-
gers a deportation proceeding. The earlier version of the IRPA indicated 
that when a security certificate was requested, a permanent resident “may” 
be detained under this provision and a foreign national “must” be de-
tained—as discussed more later in this article, this provision was changed 
after the Charkaoui ruling.38 A federal judge then reviews the certificate to 
determine reasonableness. Under the version of the IRPA considered by the 
Charkaoui Court, the Government could request an in camera review, with-
out the detainee or his representative present, if the evidence being used was 
alleged to be classified. The detainee and representative were not allowed to 
tion has been approved to replace the pre-existing version.  See Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶ 
143.
35 See Joint Statement by the Hon. Anne McLellan, Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of 
Pub. Safety and Emergency Preparedness & the Hon. Irwin Cotler, Minister of Justice & 
Attorney General of Can., On the Occasion of Appearances before the Senate Special Comm. 
on the Anti-Terrorism Act & the House of Commons Subcomm. on Pub. Safety and Nat’l 
Sec. (Nov. 14, 2005), http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/spe-disc/2005/doc_31726.ht 
ml. 
36 See Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶ 2 (explaining the purpose of security certificates). 
37 Id. 
38 See id. ¶¶ 6–9. 
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see such evidence, although the evidence could form the basis of any deci-
sion made. In some circumstances, a detainee could be given a summary of 
the evidence, but this summary could not include any of the information that 
had been determined to be sensitive to national security. There was no right 
of appeal if the judge found the certificate reasonable.39
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION: CHARKAOUI V. CANADA (CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION)
The men detained after September 11, 2001 brought extensive legal 
proceedings, attempting to secure their releases and to prevent their deporta-
tions.40 In February 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that specific components 
of the scheme violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the 
Charter), which forms part of the Canadian Constitution.41
The appellants argued that the IRPA security certificate provision 
violated five sections of the Charter: the right of life, liberty, and security of 
the person found in Section 7; the guarantee against arbitrary detention 
found in Section 9; the guarantee of prompt review of detentions found in 
Section 10(c); the prohibition on cruel and unusual treatment found in Sec-
tion 12; and the guarantee of equal protection under the law found in Sec-
tion 15. The appellants additionally argued that the security certificate pro-
vision violated the rule of law.42
The Court agreed that the security certificate procedure, as it stood, 
violated rights guaranteed under Sections 7, 9, and 10 of the Charter. In 
addition, the Court rejected the Government’s argument that the scheme 
could be justified under Section 1 of the Charter.43 Section 1 is a general 
limitation clause that applies to all rights and freedoms protected under the 
Charter: 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and 
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.44
Despite accepting the appellants’ arguments discussed above, the 
Court rejected their claims that the scheme violated a ban on indefinite de-
39 See id. ¶ 5 (explaining the IRPA procedure). 
40 See id. ¶ 10. 
41 Id. ¶ 138–143; see also Part V, infra (explaining the more detailed aspects of the court 
ruling).
42 Id. ¶ 11. 
43 Id. ¶¶ 11, 138–143. 
44 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, §1 (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms]. 
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tentions, constituted a violation of equal protection principles, or violated 
the rule of law.45 The Court suspended its ruling for one year, giving the 
Government until February 2008 to put together a new statutory frame-
work.46 The Court noted that the “reasonableness” of Charkaoui’s security 
certificate had not yet been determined, and that, should the Government 
choose to determine its reasonableness during the year of suspension, the 
pre-existing provision of the IRPA would apply. After that year, given the 
declared unconstitutionality of the IRPA, all existing certificates would 
lapse unless a replacement statute was enacted.47
The Court reflected on the so-called “tension” between certain fun-
damental liberties and the idea of national security. Specifically, it noted: 
One of the most fundamental responsibilities of a government is to ensure 
the security of its citizens. This may require it to act on information that it 
cannot disclose and to detain people who threaten national security. Yet in 
a constitutional democracy, governments must act accountably and in con-
formity with the Constitution and the rights and liberties it guarantees. 
These two propositions describe a tension that lies at the heart of modern 
democratic governance. It is a tension that must be resolved in a way that 
respects the imperatives both of security and of accountable constitutional 
governance.48   
The Court noted that the deportation of non-citizens, by itself, 
would not automatically breach the protections guaranteed under Section 7 
of the Charter, but that certain aspects of the deportation process, such as 
detention under a security certificate or deportation to torture, might do so 
given the significant infringement on their liberty interests.49 The Court 
further noted that Section 7 inquiries do not involve the question of whether 
liberty interests should be balanced against societal interests but, rather, 
whether a limitation imposed on liberty respects the principles of fundamen-
tal justice.50 If the process is deemed to be fundamentally unfair, the inquiry 
then shifts to Section 1 of the Charter, and the Government can then argue 
that the process, even if flawed, has a justification relating to the public in-
terest.51  The Court explained: 
As this Court stated in Suresh, “[t]he greater the effect on the life of the 
individual by the decision, the greater the need for procedural protections 
to meet the common law duty of fairness and the requirements of funda-
45 Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶ 143.
46 Id. ¶ 140.  
47 Id. 
48 Id. ¶ 1. 
49 Id. ¶ 17. 
50 Id. ¶¶ 21–22. 
51 Id. ¶ 22. 
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mental justice under s. 7 of the Charter.” Thus, “factual situations which 
are closer or analogous to criminal proceedings will merit greater vigilance 
by the courts.”52   
The Court concluded that national security constraints may limit the 
procedural protections available under Section 7 of the Charter, but national 
security constraints cannot be allowed to erode those protections to the point 
where the guarantees of Section 7 no longer exist.53 Rather, under Section 7, 
protections must be “meaningful and substantial.”54 The fact that evidence 
is withheld from the detainee, based on security concerns, and that the judge 
is therefore left as the only participant to question any such evidence, leads 
to the conclusion that the requirements of procedural fairness, whereby a 
person must be shown the case against him, are not only undermined but are 
“effectively gutted.”  In the Court’s words, “[h]ow can one meet a case one 
does not know?”55
The Court specifically noted that less intrusive alternatives were 
available. Under Section 1 of the Charter, for example, the Government 
could justify the abridged access to supposedly secret information. The 
Court referred to the process used in the United Kingdom involving “special 
advocates,” who represent the interests of the detainee at the hearings while 
maintaining the confidentiality of the information.56
Additionally, the Court concluded that the lack of a timely review 
for foreign nationals was a violation of Sections 9 and 10 of the Charter.57
Specifically, the Court ruled that barring judicial review for 120 days, in the 
case of a foreign national, after a determination that a security certificate is 
“reasonable,” violates the Charter protections against arbitrary detention 
found in Section 9 and the right to a prompt review found in Section 10.58
Citing a number of international cases, including the U.S. Supreme Court 
Rasul decision, the Court insisted that “foreign nationals, like others, have a 
right to prompt review to ensure that their detention complies with the 
law.”59
52 Id. ¶ 25 (internal citations omitted) (citing Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1, ¶ 118 (Can.) and Dehghani v. Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053, 1077 (Can.)). 
53 Id. ¶ 27. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. ¶ 64. 
56 Id. ¶¶ 69, 81–87. 
57 Id. ¶¶ 91–94. 
58 Id. ¶ 94. 
59 Id. ¶ 90 (citing various authorities, including Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)). 
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IV. THE RESPONSE OF THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT
In October 2007, the Canadian Government introduced a Bill in 
Parliament, called “An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protec-
tion Act (certificate and special advocate) and to make a consequential 
amendment to another Act,” also known as Bill C-3 (Bill C-3).60 After hear-
ings before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, 
Bill C-3 was presented, in a revised form, to the House of Commons in De-
cember 2007.61 Bill C-3 was subsequently approved in both Houses of Par-
liament, receiving Royal Assent in February 2008.62
The most significant change contained in Bill C-3 is a procedure al-
lowing for the appointment of “special advocates”63 in security certificate 
proceedings.64 Some of the specifics of this provision were revised after Bill 
C-3 went through the Committee review.65 For example, a judge may ap-
point a special advocate “after hearing representations from the permanent 
resident or foreign national and the Minister and after giving particular con-
sideration and weight to the preferences of the permanent resident or foreign 
national.”66 This revision still allows a judge to hear evidence outside of the 
presence of the permanent resident or foreign national and legal counsel, if 
“in the judge’s opinion, its disclosure could be injurious to national security 
60 Bill C-3 was enacted in February 2008. For clarity within this article, the prior version 
of the IRPA, considered by the Supreme Court, will be referred to as the IRPA, and the new 
legislation will be referred to as Bill C-3. Bill C-3, An Act to amend the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act (certificate and special advocate) and to make a consequential 
amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 39th Parl., 2007, available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/co
ntent/hoc/Bills/392/Government/C-3/C-3_2/C-3_2.PDF [hereinafter Bill C-3]. The Canadian 
Library of Parliament released a legislative summary on Bill C-3. Canada, Parliament, Par-
liamentary Information and Research Service, “Legislative Summary — Bill C-3: An Act to 
amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and special advocate) and to 
make a consequential amendment to another Act,” No. LS-576E (Nov. 2, 2007, rev. Dec. 31, 
2007), available at  http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/2/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/summaries/c3-e.
pdf [hereinafter Legislative Summary].  
61 Legislative Summary, supra note 60, at 1; Parliament of Canada, LEGISinfo Status of 
the Bill: Bill C-3 http://www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISINFO/index.asp?Language=E&Chamber=N& 
StartList=A&EndList=Z&Session=15&Type=0&Scope=I&query=5278&List=stat (last visit 
ed Apr. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Bill Status].  
62 Bill Status, supra note 61.
63 Bill C-3 describes the role of a special advocate as follows: “A special advocate’s role is 
to protect the interests of the permanent resident or foreign national in a proceeding under 
any of sections 78 and 82 to 82.2 when information or other evidence is heard in the absence 
of the public and of the permanent resident or foreign national and their counsel.” Bill C-3, 
supra note 60, at cl. 85.1(1).   
64 Bill C-3, supra note 60, at cls. 83–85.6. 
65 Bill Status, supra note 61. 
66 Bill C-3, supra note 60, at cl. 83(1)(b). 
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or endanger the safety of any person.”67 For such evidence, the judge also is 
charged with ensuring confidentiality.68 Bill C-3 provides for the judge to 
give the permanent resident or foreign national a “summary” of the evi-
dence being used against him, to allow him to be “reasonably informed of 
the case made by the Minister in the proceeding but that does not include 
anything that, in the judge’s opinion, would be injurious to national security 
or endanger the safety of any person if disclosed.”69 Even if a summary of 
evidence is not provided to a permanent resident or foreign national, the 
judge may base a decision on the undisclosed evidence70—a change from 
the prior version of the IRPA that required the prosecution to produce the 
evidence summary in order to be considered.71 In describing the evidence 
that can be used, the Committee version included an added provision that 
such evidence could not include any information obtained through the use 
of torture.72 The Committee revision also allowed for the permanent resi-
dent or foreign national to request a specific person as the special advocate, 
unless the judge found such an appointment would: (1) result in an unrea-
sonable delay of the proceedings; (2) create a conflict of interest; or (3) 
compromise national security because the special advocate “ha[d] know-
ledge of information or other evidence whose disclosure would be injurious 
to national security or endanger the safety of any person and, in the cir-
cumstances, there [was] a risk of inadvertent disclosure of that information 
or other evidence.”73
The special advocate can challenge the Minister’s claim that the 
disclosure of information could be injurious to national security or endanger 
the safety of any person. The special advocate can further challenge “the 
relevance, reliability and sufficiency of information or other evidence that is 
provided by the Minister and is not disclosed to the permanent resident or 
foreign national and their counsel, and the weight to be given to it.”74 Bill 
C-3, however, specifically provides that the special advocate is not a party 
to the proceeding and does not have a solicitor-client relationship with the 
permanent resident or foreign national.75
67 Id. at cl. 83(1)(c). The prior version of the IRPA contained language that the judge had 
to find that the disclosure “would be injurious to national security or endanger the safety of 
any person,” thus making it easier for a judge to so find. Legislative Summary, supra note 
60, at 14 (emphasis in original). 
68 Bill C-3, supra note 60, at cl. 83(1)(d). 
69 Id. at cl. 83(1)(e). 
70 Id. at cl. 83(1)(i) 
71 Legislative Summary, supra note 60, at 16. 
72 Bill C–3, supra note 60, at cl. 83(1.1). 
73 Id. at cl. 83(1.2). 
74 Id. at cl. 85.1(2). 
75 Id. at cl. 85.1(3). 
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In response to criticism regarding the role of the special advocate, 
the Committee added a provision that, notwithstanding the fact that there is 
no solicitor-client relationship, any communication between the special ad-
vocate and the permanent resident or foreign national and his counsel is 
privileged, if it would be a privileged communication in the case of a solici-
tor-client communication.76 Additionally, a special advocate cannot be 
compelled to appear at a proceeding as a witness.77 During the proceeding, 
the special advocate may make submissions regarding evidence that the 
prosecution did not provide to the permanent resident or foreign national 
and his counsel.78 The special advocate also may cross-examine and other-
wise question witnesses for any part of the proceeding in which the perma-
nent resident or foreign national and his counsel are not allowed to be 
present.79 Finally, the special advocate may “exercise, with the judge’s au-
thorization, any other powers that are necessary to protect the interests of 
the permanent resident or foreign national.”80 The special advocate, upon 
receiving the confidential information, may communicate with another per-
son about the proceeding only with the judge’s authorization. The judge, 
however, may authorize only limited disclosure.81
Bill C-3 further addresses concerns over the fact that the finding of 
reasonableness of the security certificate, which constitutes a removal order, 
was not appealable under the prior version of the IRPA. The new version 
provides a right of appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, provided that the 
judge first “certifies that a serious question of general importance is in-
volved and states the question.” 82 There is no right of interlocutory appeal.83
The prior version of the IRPA had disparate requirements relating 
to detention, depending on whether the person was a permanent resident or 
a foreign national. The new Bill C-3 makes the requirements for detention 
the same for both permanent residents and for foreign nationals. Under Bill 
C-3, neither the permanent resident nor the foreign national will be detained 
unless the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and the Minister of Pub-
lic Safety and Emergency Preparedness issue a warrant for the person’s 
arrest and detention after they have established “reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the person is a danger to national security or to the safety of any 
76 Id. at cl. 85.1(4). 
77 Id.
78 Id. at cl. 85.2(a). 
79 Id. at cl. 85.2(b). 
80 Id. at cl. 85.2(c). 
81 Id. at cl. 85.4(2). 
82 Id. at cl. 79. 
83 Id.
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person or is unlikely to appear at a proceeding or for removal.”84 For both 
permanent residents and foreign nationals, a judge must now review the 
detention within 48 hours of arrest.85 Under the previous version of the 
IRPA, a judge was only required to review the detention of permanent resi-
dents 86 Once a security certificate is found reasonable, the detainee may 
now apply to the Federal Court for further review at six-month intervals.87
While a judge was previously required to detain a person after a finding that 
this person continued to be a threat to national security,88 Bill C-3 only al-
lows the judge to continue detention if there is an additional finding that a 
release under conditions will not address the perceived risk.89 The Minister 
may order that a detained person be released at any time to allow departure 
from Canada.90
V. ONGOING PROBLEMS WITH CANADIAN SECURITY CERTIFICATES
The Supreme Court of Canada certainly deserves praise for its un-
animous ruling, particularly in the often-controversial area of terrorism alle-
gations. In deciding that certain fundamental liberty protections cannot be 
compromised to such an extent, the Court struck a blow in favor of judicial 
fairness, during a time when governments around the world have been ag-
gressively seeking to limit judicial oversight of the detentions of those they 
suspect of terrorism. More generally, the Court made a powerful statement 
about the role of the judiciary in protecting the rights of individuals who 
come before the Court. After the Charkaoui decision, it is clear that Canada 
does not stand for the proposition that public interest can always undermine 
individual human rights. The unanimous Charkaoui decision stands in con-
trast, for instance, to the deeply divided U.S. Supreme Court in the “War on 
Terror” cases.91
Charkaoui seems, in some ways, especially remarkable given the 
Court’s rejection of the Government’s claim that any infringements on tra-
84 Id. at cl. 81. 
85 Id. at cls. 82(1)–82(3). 
86 Legislative Summary, supra note 60, at 18. 
87 Bill C-3, supra note 60, at cl. 82(3). 
88 Legislative Summary, supra note 60, at 18–19. 
89 Bill C-3, supra note 60, at cl. 82(5)(a). 
90 Id. at cl. 82.4. 
91 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (ruling 5-4 in favor of the detainees); 
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 468, 485 (2004) (ruling 6-3 in favor of the detainee); Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 508, 533–359 (2004) (plurality opinion, holding 8-1 on the issue of 
whether the President could deprive a U.S. citizen of habeas corpus remedies); Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 577 (2006) (The Court ruled 5-3 in favor of the detainee. Chief Justice 
John Roberts recused himself from the case because he had been involved in the appellate 
court decision, which ruled against the detainee.). 
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ditional rights protections could be justified under Section 1 of the Charter. 
Section 1 of the Charter, which explicitly allows for limitation of Charter 
rights when certain standards are met, distinguishes the Canadian approach 
to the constitutional protection of human rights from that of the United 
States, where the Bill of Rights contains no similar provision.92 Thus, the 
finding by the Court that the IRPA is inconsistent with Sections 7, 9 and 10 
of the Charter was not the end of the story. The analysis then shifted to Sec-
tion 1 to determine whether such limitations may be demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society. This justification reflects both the law’s 
objectives, which must be pressing and substantial, and the means em-
ployed, which must be proportional. While the Charkaoui Court readily 
agreed to the pressing and substantial need to prevent terrorist attacks in 
Canada, the fact that other jurisdictions had found ways to pursue similar 
objectives in a manner that better accommodated the need for due process 
weighed heavily on the analysis of the proportionality of such measures, 
ultimately leading to the conclusion that the restrictions could not be saved 
under Section 1.93
While there is much to praise in the Court’s reasoning in this case, 
significant concerns remain over specific aspects of the ruling as well as 
with the Canadian Government’s legislative response to that ruling. First, 
the fact that the Court suspended its ruling for a year, in order to give the 
Canadian Government time to respond, is troubling. Given the Court’s clear 
view that the security certificate legislation had some connection to matters 
of national security, it may seem understandable that the Court wished to 
ensure that the Government was not put in a position of possibly compro-
mising national security. That said, however, having found that national 
security did not justify the violation of fundamental Charter rights of these 
detainees, the Court seemed oddly unconcerned with the fact that it was 
authorizing the potential detention of persons for an entire year without any 
constitutionally legitimate basis. The very length of time granted to the 
Government to devise a lawful alternative to the scheme struck down by the 
Court seems subject to criticism. In contrast to the Canadian Court, the Brit-
ish Government promptly responded to the decision of the House of Lords, 
which ruled that the law allowing for indefinite security detention was in-
compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.94 The House 
of Lords issued its decision in December 2004 and by January 2005, the 
Government had announced its plans to create a new system of control or-
ders meeting the requirements of the European Convention on Human 
92 Compare Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 44, § 1, with U.S. 
CONST. amends. I–X. 
93 Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶¶ 66–94. 
94 See Belmarsh Destainees, supra note 4, ¶¶ 46, 66, 73. 
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Rights. This new system was enacted in March 2005.95 Given the depriva-
tion of liberty involved in any suspension of the finding of unconstitutio-
nality, the Supreme Court could have sent a much more clear signal to the 
Government that this was a matter of urgency.  
Second, it is unclear why the Court did not see fit to open the door 
to an ad hoc review of the detention of the individuals named in the appeal 
which would have conformed to Canadian constitutional law. In similar 
circumstances, for instance, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal (Federal 
Court) previously has agreed to appoint an amicus curiae to act in a manner 
quite similar to the special advocates, whose intervention is described in 
approving terms in the Supreme Court’s decision.96 Acting pursuant to its 
inherent powers, the Federal Court in Khadr v. Canada appointed an amicus
curiae to challenge evidence withheld from the applicant for national secu-
rity reasons.97 Even though the applicants in Charkaoui and associated cases 
did not make amicus curiae applications, perhaps making it impossible for 
the Supreme Court to directly issue such an order, mentioning this option 
would have been an appropriate way for the Court to suggest that immediate 
review of the validity of each detention could be achieved by appointing an 
amicus curiae.  Had the Court done so, then at least it would have sent a 
signal that some interim measure was needed to avoid allowing the Charter 
violations to continue unabated for a year.98 Quite to the contrary, however, 
95 Id.; Britain Unveils “House Arrest” Law, CNN, Feb. 22, 2005, http://edition.cnn.com/2 
005/WORLD/europe/02/22/uk.detentions/; Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (U.K.) 
[hereinafter Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005]. Additionally, the Canadian Government, 
working within the timeframes set by the Charkaoui Court, did not introduce proposed legis-
lation in Parliament until October 2007—eight months after the Supreme Court's ruling—
creating apparent pressure for Parliament to then act quickly to meet the Court’s February 
2008 deadline. See Canada Introduces Controversial Anti-Terror Provisions,
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Oct. 23, 2007, http://www.oht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/23 
/america/NA-GEN-Canada-Anti-Terror-Bill.php. 
96 See Khadr v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 46, ¶¶ 20–27 (Can.) [hereinafter 
Khadr]. The Khadr Court noted that before the Supreme Court's decision in Charkaoui the 
Federal Courts did afford both Charkaoui and Almrei an opportunity to bring motions to 
appoint amici in supporting their conditional release applications. Nonetheless Charkaoui 
and Almrei both declined the appointment of amici. Id. ¶ 17 (citing to Charkaoui (Re), supra
note 8, and Almrei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 1025 
(Can.) [hereinafter Almrei]). Charkaoui’s refusal of an amicus was based on an ongoing 
objection to the use of confidential evidence at all. Charkaoui (Re), supra note 8, ¶¶ 14–15. 
The counsel for Almrei similarly declined an amicus because of a concern of further delaying 
the proceedings. Almrei, supra, ¶ 17.  
97 See Khadr, supra note 96, ¶¶ 20–27.
98 As the Khadr court explained, Harkat filed a motion to appoint an amicus before the 
Supreme Court’s Charkaoui ruling, and had been denied, based, in part, on the Court’s find-
ing that the legislation allowed for the judge to adequately discharge the duties imposed — a 
conclusion later expressly disavowed by the Supreme Court in Charkaoui, and leading to the 
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the Court specified that should the Government wish to proceed with an 
assessment of the reasonableness of Charkaoui’s security certificate during 
the year of suspension, the unconstitutional provisions of the IRPA would 
still apply.99 Additionally, those certificates previously found to be “reason-
able” under the prior procedure would not lose their reasonable status dur-
ing that one-year suspension period.100
Beyond the issues discussed above, three substantive concerns re-
main in view of both the Supreme Court’s decision in Charkaoui and the 
Government’s legislative response: (1) the ongoing discrimination between 
Canadian nationals and non-nationals, which lies at the heart of the Cana-
dian approach to security detention; (2) the ongoing use of secret evidence 
and the mechanisms resorted to in order to protect both national security 
and the rights of the named person; and (3) the applicable standard under 
which a Court may find that a person is reasonably being detained as a 
threat to national security. 
A.  The Discrimination Issue 
The Court’s conclusion that the security certificate procedure was 
not discriminatory in nature is deeply troubling, given the applicability of 
this detention practice only to non-citizens of Canada suspected of terror-
ism, and not to citizens under similar suspicion. Far from seeing it as a 
problem, the Government apparently considers the discriminatory aspect of 
security detention as a strong selling point, highlighting the fact that Cana-
dian nationals are immune to this type of restriction on their rights. 101 The 
exemption of citizens is alarming considering that non-nationals hold no 
monopoly on terrorism threats, in Canada or elsewhere. 
The Court discussed the landmark decision out of the United King-
dom, A (FC) and others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(Belmarsh Detainees), in which the House of Lords considered terrorism-
related detentions under immigration provisions.102 Factually, the cases bore 
establishment of the special advocate system. See Khadr, supra note 96, ¶¶ 14–16  (citing 
Harkat (Re), 2004 FC 1717, ¶ 56 (Can.)). 
99 Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶ 140. 
100 Id. 
101 For example, Canadian Minister of Public Safety, the Hon. Stockwell Day, made state-
ments before the House of Commons in support of the proposed legislation. “I would en-
courage all colleagues to set aside partisanship to realize that the security certificates have 
been proven not to threaten the individual rights and freedoms of Canadians. As a matter of 
fact, the security certificate cannot even be applied against a Canadian citizen. It can only be 
used on foreign nationals or those who are not Canadian citizens.” 142 39th Parl. Deb., H.C. 
2nd Session, (2008) No. 041, at 1340, available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications 
/Publication.aspx?Pub=Hansard&Doc=41&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=2. 
102 Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶¶  125-131 (discussing Belmarsh Detainees, supra note 4).  
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some similarities, since the detainees in the U.K. case had been ordered 
deported, but the deportations could not occur because of the risk of torture 
in the receiving countries.103 The Belmarsh detainees had never been 
charged with any criminal offense, but most continued to be held based on 
the British Government’s claim that it would be a risk to national security to 
release them.104 The House of Lords rejected this argument, in part because 
of the discriminatory nature of these detentions, which only applied to non-
nationals.105
The Supreme Court in Charkaoui found the IRPA legislation to be 
distinguishable from the statute considered in Belmarsh Detainees because 
the U.K. legislation allowed for indefinite detention, while the IRPA re-
quires periodic review of detention.106 In fact, the legislation considered by 
the House of Lords was quite similar to that considered in the Charkaoui
case, although it did contain language that explicitly allowed for indefinite 
detentions where deportation could not be carried out.107 While the IRPA 
does not contain such express language, as the Supreme Court had already 
noted, the effect in certain cases could still be indefinite detention. For ex-
ample, appellant Hassan Almrei, who has been detained for seven years in, 
does not know “when, if ever, he will be released.”108 The distinction be-
tween the two statutes based on the indefinite detention language in the 
U.K. legislation would thus not appear to significantly distinguish the secu-
rity detention schemes. 
The Supreme Court noted that the security certificate provision of 
the IRPA was not discriminatory on its face because although only non-
nationals were subject to the IRPA, immigration legislation by its very defi-
nition only applies to non-nationals. The Court specifically stated that de-
tentions for the purpose of deportation did not represent prohibited discrim-
ination, and concluded that the detentions before the Court had not “become 
unhinged from the state’s purpose of deportation.”109 This conclusion seems 
open to challenge, however, in cases such as those that were before the 
Court in Charkaoui, where the facts suggested that the detainees could not 
be deported because of a risk of torture, and yet they still continued to be 
103 See Belmarsh Detainees, supra note 4, ¶ 9. 
104 See id. ¶¶ 1–3.
105 Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶¶ 125-28 (citing Belmarsh Detainees, supra note 4). 
106 Id. ¶¶ 125–131. 
107 See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, 2001 c. 24, § 23 (“A suspected inter-
national terrorist may be detained under a provision specified in subsection (2) despite the 
fact that his removal or departure from the United Kingdom is prevented (whether temporari-
ly or indefinitely) by (a) a point of law which wholly or partly relates to an international 
agreement, or (b) a practical consideration.”). 
108 Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶ 13. 
109 Id. ¶ 131. 
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detained, admittedly for national security reasons. The claim that these de-
tentions, under the circumstances, were still connected with the policy of 
deportation seems questionable. 
Indeed, it appears that the factual scenarios presented by cases like 
Charkaoui present the possibility for indefinite detention. The detention is 
not based, as in a criminal matter, on past criminal conduct. Rather, deten-
tion is based on a fear of potential future conduct on the part of the detainee, 
a fear presumably rooted in some past action or alleged affiliation. It is dif-
ficult to imagine how frequent reviews would really change much in terms 
of the ongoing nature of such liberty restrictions. The facts giving rise to a 
fear of a future action may well not change much over time, and such 
changes may be difficult to assess. Thus, the likely ongoing fear of future 
action could still result in detention, or other liberty infringements, which 
may continue indefinitely.110 Because the person named in a security certifi-
cate often cannot be deported, the practical effect is the possibility of inde-
finite detention or, if released subject to certain conditions, indefinite re-
strictions on the person’s liberty. The distinction with the U.K. legislation 
does not appear to be a meaningful one in practice. 
Moreover, the basis on which the House of Lords found the U.K. 
detention scheme discriminatory in Belmarsh Detainees was the fact that it 
involved the use of the immigration system to address a security matter.111
Lord Bingham, for example, wrote that the detainees should be compared to 
U.K. nationals who were suspected of terrorism affiliations.112 He noted 
that, like the detainees, those nationals had the common characteristics of 
being suspected of terrorism affiliation and not being subject to removal 
from the country.113 Thus, he argued, the two groups were similarly si-
tuated, with the only distinction being that one group could be subject to 
detention based solely on national origin.114 Lord Bingham noted that, more 
generally in the immigration context, some distinction necessarily must be 
made between nationals and non-nationals, and that it is permissible to de-
tain a non-national pending deportation. Clearly, a national would not be 
subject to such a detention.115
The issue in Belmarsh Detainees was the intent behind the im-
pugned detentions. It was conceded that individuals were being detained 
110 The IRPA does provide for a release on “conditions,” which ultimately was imple-
mented for two of the three appellants in this case. Id. ¶ 10. Those conditions, as noted pre-
viously, still involve a significant infringement on liberty, and again are based on a fear of 
future conduct, and so could continue indefinitely. See IRPA, supra note 5, § 84 (2). 
111 Belmarsh Detainees, supra note 4, ¶¶ 8, 73.  
112 See id. ¶¶ 52–54. 
113 See id. ¶ 54. 
114 See id. ¶¶ 52–53, 67–68.  
115 See id. ¶¶ 67–68.
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because the British Government considered them to be safety risks through 
possible future acts of terrorism, and that they could not be deported. A 
British national, similarly suspected, could not be similarly detained be-
cause the national would not be subject to the immigration proceedings. 
Lord Bingham found this distinction unacceptable, writing “[w]hat cannot 
be justified here is the decision to detain one group of suspected interna-
tional terrorists, defined by nationality or immigration status, and not anoth-
er.”116
Lord Scott took that analysis further, noting that Article 15 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
does not justify a discriminatory distinction between different groups of 
people all of whom are suspected terrorists who together present the threat 
of terrorism and to all of whom the measures, if they really were “strictly 
necessary,” would logically be applicable. If those who are suspected ter-
rorists include some non-Muslims as well as Muslims, it would, in my 
opinion, be irrational and discriminatory to restrict the application of the 
measures to Muslims even though the bulk of those suspected are likely to 
profess to be Muslims. Some might well not be professed Muslims. Simi-
larly, it would be irrational and discriminatory to restrict the application of 
the measures to men although the bulk of those suspected are likely to be 
male. Some might well be women. Similarly, in my opinion, it is irrational 
and discriminatory to restrict the application of the measures to suspected 
terrorists who have no right of residence in this country. Some suspected 
terrorists may well be home-grown.117
Lord Scott’s last comment relating to “home-grown” terrorists ap-
peared to have been prophetic, when, several months later, three of four 
men who carried out suicide bombings in London in July 2005 turned out to 
be British nationals.118
Lord Nicholls further noted in Belmarsh Detainees that the discri-
minatory nature of these detentions was sufficiently compelling to provide a 
basis for judicial intervention on a national security measure, because nor-
mally Parliament would enjoy greater leeway. In fact, Parliament’s failure 
to enact corresponding provisions allowing for the detention of nationals 
presenting a similar threat undermined the entire scheme: 
The difficulty with according to Parliament the substantial latitude normal-
ly to be given to decisions on national security is the weakness already 
mentioned: security considerations have not prompted a similar negation 
of the right to personal liberty in the case of nationals who pose a similar 
116 Id. ¶ 68. 
117 Id. ¶ 158. 
118 See Dominic McGoldrick, Security Detention – U.K. Practice, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 507, 513 (noting, additionally, that by the end of 2007 eight U.K. nationals were subject to 
control orders). 
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security risk. The government, indeed, has expressed the view that a ‘dra-
conian’ power to detain British citizens who may be involved in interna-
tional terrorism ‘would be difficult to justify.’ But, in practical terms, 
power to detain indefinitely is no more draconian in the case of a British 
citizen than in the case of a non-national. There is no significant difference 
in the potential adverse impact of such a power on (1) a national and (2) a 
non-national who in practice cannot leave the country for fear of torture 
abroad. 119
It is clear that the issue of discrimination—based on the use of the 
immigration system to detain only non-nationals suspected of terrorism— 
was central to the House of Lord’s declaration that the detention scheme 
was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Turning back to Canada, the Supreme Court in Charkaoui dealt 
with the discrimination argument under Section 15 of the Charter in a cur-
sory manner, distinguishing the House of Lords’ decision in Belmarsh De-
tainees on the basis that British law explicitly entertained the possibility of 
indefinite detention for non-nationals only.120 As noted above, however, that 
does not seem to have been the pivotal issue for the House of Lords. Rather, 
the Law Lords seem to have based their finding of discrimination on the 
application of detentions to terrorism suspects who were non-nationals (and 
not nationals), and on the overarching inappropriateness of using the immi-
gration system to further national security objectives. It was that disparity 
more than the potential length of the detention that seemed pivotal.121
This distinction is important because the House of Lords found the 
entire scheme invalid, largely based on this part of its ruling. The Supreme 
Court, however, in failing to find the scheme discriminatory, left the over-
arching system in place, choosing to address some of the underlying proce-
dural problems rather than acknowledging that the entire system was 
flawed. The Supreme Court invited a Government response focused on pro-
cedural mechanisms rather than on the more fundamental human rights im-
plications of this detention scheme. The Court’s suggestion that the security 
detention had not become “unhinged” from the deportation process seems to 
unquestionably accept a legislative scheme that could be challenged as dis-
ingenuous. Deportation and detention must each be justified on its own dis-
tinct merits. Clearly, a non-national engaged in the planning of terrorist ac-
tivities can be deported from Canada on that basis. The mere fact that de-
portation has been ordered cannot, on its own, justify detention. Risk of 
flight offers a basis for detention that seems fully related to the interests 
behind deportation, because flight can derail expulsion from the country. 
119 See Belmarsh Detainees, supra note 4, ¶ 83. 
120 Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶ 130. 
121 See Belmarsh Detainees, supra note 4, ¶ 83. 
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Conversely, conspiracy to commit a terrorist attack certainly can justify, in 
some circumstances, the detention of suspected individuals, whatever their 
nationality. The fact that the deportation and terrorist conspiracy coexist in 
some cases does not mean that they become inextricably linked in any case, 
so that, henceforth, the interests behind deportation can be assumed to justi-
fy detention. This seems self-evident in situations in which deportation is 
impossible de facto or de jure, meaning that detention can no longer be ra-
tionally justified as necessary to ensure the deportation process. Detention 
of anyone as a means of trying to disrupt a terrorist conspiracy should be 
justified by a process and on bases which meet the constitutional guarantees 
entrenched in the Charter.122 If a distinction is introduced between nationals 
and non-nationals in that scheme, then that distinction should be justified 
under the terms of Sections 1 and 15 of the Charter. That is the type of anal-
ysis which led the House of Lords to reject the British security detention 
scheme in Belmarsh Detainees but which, inexplicably, is side-stepped by 
the Supreme Court in Charkaoui.
In closing on the issue of discrimination, even if the detention pow-
ers claimed by the Government in Charkaoui were extended to include citi-
zens, thus addressing the discrimination issue, this does not mean that such 
detentions necessarily would be justified. As Lord Hoffman famously wrote 
in the Belmarsh Detainees ruling: 
Others of your Lordships who are also in favour of allowing the appeal 
would do so, not because there is no emergency threatening the life of the 
nation, but on the ground that a power of detention confined to foreigners 
is irrational and discriminatory. I would prefer not to express a view on 
this point. I said that the power of detention is at present confined to fo-
reigners and I would not like to give the impression that all that was neces-
sary was to extend the power to United Kingdom citizens as well. In my 
opinion, such a power in any form is not compatible with our constitution. 
The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in 
accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from 
terrorism but from laws such as these. That is the true measure of what ter-
rorism may achieve. It is for Parliament to decide whether to give the ter-
rorists such a victory.123
B.  Secret Evidence 
In Charkaoui the Supreme Court expressed considerable concern 
about the use of evidence against a detainee to whom the evidence had nev-
er been shown. The finding that the IRPA scheme violated Section 7 of the 
Charter was heavily based on the fact that the evidence was not made avail-
122 Compare id. 
123 Id. ¶ 97. 
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able for the person to dispute. The Court thus noted that “a fair hearing re-
quires that the affected person be informed of the case against him or her, 
and be permitted to respond to that case.”124 The Court rejected the Gov-
ernment’s argument that this was offset by the powers given to the review-
ing judge, explaining that: 
The judge is therefore not in a position to compensate for the lack of in-
formed scrutiny, challenge and counter-evidence that a person familiar 
with the case could bring. Such scrutiny is the whole point of the principle 
that a person whose liberty is in jeopardy must know the case to meet. 
Here that principle has not merely been limited; it has been effectively gut-
ted. How can one meet a case one does not know?125
The Charkaoui decision referred approvingly to the special advo-
cate system in the U.K. as a model which better reconciles the need for con-
fidentiality of sources and the protection of the detainees’s fundamental 
rights.126 Interestingly, this system has been criticized in the U.K. itself as 
unfair, in large part because it deprives detainees of a meaningful chance to 
know of the evidence against them. The British Parliament Joint Committee 
on Human Rights, for example, issued a harsh condemnation of the special-
advocate system, calling it “Kafkaesque” and comparing it to the “Star 
Chamber.”127
The U.K. House of Lords issued three important rulings on October 
31, 2007, in which, among other things, they raised concerns about the spe-
cial-advocate system.128 In Secretary of State for the Home Department v. 
MB (FC)(MB) the House of Lords considered the 2005 Prevention of Ter-
rorism Act, the Government’s answer to the Belmarsh Detainees case, 
which allowed for control orders to be issued on the basis of evidence with-
held from those subject to them. Control orders are used in the U.K. as a 
less severe deprivation of liberty than detention for those suspected of ter-
rorism.129 The orders can apply to either citizens or non-citizens. A person 
can be subjected to a variety of restrictions of liberty, based on a finding 
124 Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶ 53. 
125 Id. ¶ 64. 
126 Id. ¶ 80.  
127 HOUSE OF LORDS, HOUSE OF COMMONS, JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 28 DAYS, INTERCEPT AND POST-CHARGE 
QUESTIONING, NINETEENTH REPORT, 2006–2007, H.L. 157, H.C. 394, ¶ 210, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200607/jtselect/jtrights/157/15709.htm [hereinaf-
ter Joint Committee on Human Rights]. 
128 See Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB (FC), [2007] UKHL 46, ¶¶ 34–
40, 54, 60–77, 82–87 (U.K.) [hereinafter MB]; Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
JJ and Others [2007] UKHL 45, ¶ 56 (U.K.) [hereinafter JJ]; Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v. E and another, [2007] UKHL 47 (U.K.) [hereinafter E] . 
129 MB, supra note 128; see also Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, supra note 95. 
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that the person poses some risk to national security or a risk of harm.130 The 
restrictions can include measures such as house arrest, limitations on 
movement, association, and communications.131 With some limitations, the 
House of Lords generally upheld the validity of the new control orders sys-
tem.132 Some of the Lords, however, had specific concerns about the spe-
cial-advocate system, particularly because of its interconnection with the 
use of evidence that is withheld from the detainee.133
The House of Lords in MB relied on language from Charkaoui,
quoted above, in explaining the importance of allowing the controlled per-
son to be shown the evidence being used against him.134 Lord Bingham ad-
ditionally cited authorities from around the world to support the proposition 
that, where a deprivation of liberty is contemplated, the person’s right to be 
apprised of the case against him is a fundamental aspect to procedural fair-
ness.135 He included the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
among many other authorities, for the basic proposition that a detainee has a 
right to be apprised of evidence against him, and the right to be heard, 
which the Hamdi Court had described as “essential constitutional promis-
es.”136 While noting that special advocates undoubtedly aid in the process, 
Lord Bingham pointed out that: 
“[t]he use of an SAA is, however, never a panacea for the grave disadvan-
tages of a person affected not being aware of the case against him.” The 
reason is obvious. In any ordinary case, a client instructs his advocate what 
his defence is to the charges made against him, briefs the advocate on the 
weaknesses and vulnerability of the adverse witnesses, and indicates what 
evidence is available by way of rebuttal. This is a process which it may be 
impossible to adopt if the controlled person does not know the allegations 
made against him and cannot therefore give meaningful instructions, and 
the special advocate, once he knows what the allegations are, cannot tell 
the controlled person or seek instructions without permission, which in 
practice (as I understand) is not given.“Grave disadvantage” is not, I think, 
an exaggerated description of the controlled person's position where such 
circumstances obtain. I would respectfully agree with the opinion of Lord 
Woolf in Roberts, para 83(vii), that the task of the court in any given case 
130 See generally Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, supra note 95. 
131 See generally id. 
132 See MB, supra note 128, ¶¶ 77–79, 92; JJ, supra note 128, ¶¶ 47–53; E, supra note 128, 
¶¶ 21–27, 31. It is notable that a control order scheme was recently upheld by the High Court 
of Australia. See Thomas v Mowbray [2007] H.C.A. 33, ¶ 154 (Austl.) available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2007/33.html. 
133 MB, supra note 128, ¶¶ 24, 90. 
134 Id.  ¶ 30. 
135 Id. ¶¶ 29–34. 
136 Id. ¶ 30 (quoting Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004)). 
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is to decide, looking at the process as a whole, whether a procedure has 
been used which involved significant injustice to the controlled person.137
Still in MB, Lord Brown agreed that the right to a fair hearing could 
not be absolutely guaranteed through the special advocate process, noting 
that he could not 
accept that a suspect's entitlement to an essentially fair hearing is merely a 
qualified right capable of being outweighed by the public interest in pro-
tecting the state against terrorism (vital though, of course, I recognise that 
public interest to be). On the contrary, it seems to me not merely an abso-
lute right but one of altogether too great importance to be sacrificed on the 
altar of terrorism control. By the same token that evidence derived from 
the use of torture must always be rejected so as to safeguard the integrity 
of the judicial process and avoid bringing British justice into disrepute so 
too in my judgment must closed material be rejected if reliance on it would 
necessarily result in a fundamentally unfair hearing.138
Given the Charkaoui Court’s concerns about the use of secret evi-
dence, it seems highly problematic that Bill C-3 allows for a special-
advocate procedure to continue to deprive the named person of access to the 
evidence being used against him. Moreover, since the Supreme Court ex-
pressly referred to the U.K.’s special-advocate system, it is of significance 
that, after the Charkaoui decision was issued, the House of Lords criticized 
the U.K. special advocate system, which supported the deprivation of evi-
dence from the controlled person. If the House of Lords criticized the sys-
tem in the case of control orders, which represent a less severe deprivation 
of liberty than detention, one plausibly can assume they would have even 
greater concerns about the system in a detention situation. 
The Canadian Government, in Bill C-3, actually lowered, rather 
than raised, the standard from the prior version of the IRPA regarding what 
level of finding is required for evidence to be kept from the detainee.139 This 
move is surprising in light of the Charkaoui Court’s conclusion that the 
standard for keeping evidence from the detainee represents a fundamental 
fairness issue. The prior version required the judge to find that the informa-
tion would be injurious to national security or the safety of any person, 
while the new version requires only that a judge find that it could be so inju-
rious in order for it to be sealed.140 Given the importance of allowing any-
137 Id. ¶ 35 (quoting Lord Woolf in R (Roberts) v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 45, 2 AC 
738, ¶ 60 (U.K.)). Lord Bingham noted, however, that the use of evidence kept from the 
controlled person might not constitute unfairness if there was enough evidence in the infor-
mation that was made available to support the order. Id. ¶ 44. 
138 Id. ¶ 91 (internal citation omitted). 
139 Bill C-3, supra note 60, at cl. 83(1)(c). 
140 Id.; Legislative Summary, supra note 60, at 14. 
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one facing detention to see and respond to the evidence against them, this 
broad and low standard is disturbing, and does not appear to meet the con-
cerns raised by the Supreme Court of Canada and other courts around the 
world.
The repercussions of a security certificate detention are quite ex-
treme and differ from the repercussions of an ordinary deportation order. 
Because a person could be permanently deprived of liberty, fairness safe-
guards must be applied that more closely resemble those in a criminal pro-
ceeding than the lesser safeguards generally applied to deportation proceed-
ings.141 There could be an argument in favor of short-term detention under 
certain circumstances involving a fear of some future behavior. In such a 
case, the standard applied could be similar to the standard applied in bail 
proceedings, where risk of flight or imminent harm to the safety of others 
can be used to justify a short-term detention under abridged procedural 
standards. Such a detention, however, is inextricably linked to the idea that, 
sometime in the near future, the person will have an opportunity, with full 
procedural safeguards, to defend against the allegations leading to the deten-
tion.  
In security certificate proceedings, the abridged detention standard 
does not appear to have any link to a future proceeding, in which full proce-
dural fairness will allow the person to defend against the detention. Once 
the detention loses its short-term nature, the deprivation of liberty becomes 
nearly indistinguishable from that resulting from a criminal conviction, 
mandating that the process authorizing such detention should more closely 
resemble the process used in regular criminal proceedings.142 The absence 
of such a conclusion in the current Canadian approach is a distinct concern. 
Fundamental to the concept of fairness is the idea that a detainee must know 
what evidence is being used to justify a detention in order to adequately 
rebut that case. Even under the revised version of the IRPA, this fundamen-
141 See Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶ 25; MB, supra note 128, ¶¶ 24, 90. 
142 The U.S. Supreme Court used similar reasoning in its decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
542 U.S. 507, 534–535 (2004)(plurality opinion). Hamdi involved the detention of a U.S. 
citizen, not an immigration detention, within the U.S. on a Government claim that he was an 
“enemy combatant.” The Court ruled that the Government might have a right to detain a 
citizen, captured on the battlefield, for the short term, but when the detention extended past a 
short-term need the citizen has an absolute right to challenge his detention before an inde-
pendent tribunal. Id. at 533–535. Hamdi had been captured in Afghanistan in 2001 and held, 
with no judicial review. Id. at 511. After the Court’s ruling, instead of bringing Hamdi before 
an impartial tribunal, the U.S. entered into a release agreement with him, under which he 
“voluntarily” relinquished his American citizenship and was sent to Saudi Arabia under 
travel restrictions. See Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 
2004, at A2, available at  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23958-
2004Oct11.html.
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tal protection is missing, calling into question the constitutionality of the 
new legislative framework.143
C.  Additional Shortcomings of Bill C-3  
Aside from the substantive problems with allowing evidence to be 
withheld from the detainee, there are additional procedural concerns regard-
ing the proposed Canadian special advocate system as set forth in Bill C-3. 
Much can be learned from the British special advocate system, on which 
Bill C-3’s procedures appear to have been based. Again, even at the time of 
the Charkaoui decision, the British special advocate system was coming 
under criticism, a fact that the Supreme Court itself acknowledged briefly in 
the Charkaoui decision.144 Some of the strongest criticism has come from 
lawyers who served as special advocates in the U.K. system, with one advo-
cate going so far as to label it “an odious blot on our legal landscape.”145
A review of the new Canadian legislation raises specific procedural 
concerns. Various groups, including Human Rights Watch, have criticized 
Bill C-3 as vague on government requirements to disclose information, es-
pecially given the fact that special advocates do not have the power to com-
pel disclosure of information not provided voluntarily by the government. 
This is true even where that evidence could be exculpatory.146 Bill C-3 also 
fails to incorporate a number of recommendations that were made before the 
revised legislation (in the form of Bill C-3) was announced. The Canadian 
Special Senate Committee on the Anti-terrorism Act, in its report on Fun-
damental Justice in Extraordinary Times, for instance, recommended that 
any special advocate system must allow the special advocate to consult with 
the detainee after the review of any secret evidence, and Bill C-3 fails to 
include this critical safeguard.147
143 See, e.g., Canada: Parliament Should Amend Bill on Special Advocates: Letter to Mem-
bers of Parliament, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Nov. 19, 2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007
/11/28/canada17435.htm [hereinafter Human Rights Watch]; Proposed Security Certificate 
Legislation Fails to Address Human Rights Shortcomings, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 
25, 2007, http://www.amnesty.ca/resource_centre/news/view.php?load=arcview&article=40 
99&c=Resource+Centre+News; Thomas Walkom, Revamped Security Bill Still Flawed,
TORONTO STAR, Dec. 13, 2007, available at  http://www.thestar.com/article/285197; Craig 
Forcese & Lorne Waldman, Canada Doesn’t Need a Star Chamber, NAT’L POST, Oct. 25, 
2007, at A23, available at http://www.nationalpost.com/news/world/Story.html?id=54716. 
144 Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶¶ 83–84. 
145 Cristin Schmitz, British-Style ‘Special Advocate’ Scheme Fails to Protect Liberties, 
Experts Urge, LAWYERS WEEKLY, Nov. 23, 2007 at 1,  
available at http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid=577.
146 Human Rights Watch, supra note 144. 
147 SPECIAL SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT, FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE IN 
EXTRAORDINARY TIMES: MAIN REPORT OF THE SPECIAL SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE ANTI-
TERRORISM ACT, Feb. 2007, at 35–36, available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/comm
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In the Charkaoui decision, the Supreme Court referred to the “ten-
sion” between personal liberty interests and concerns for national securi-
ty.148 Opinions may differ as to whether and to what extent such a tension 
indeed exists, and where any “balance” should be struck if there is to be 
balancing at all. It is apparent though that if one concedes that a government 
may need to use extraordinary measures in some cases to limit liberty, there 
could be greater procedural fairness than included in Bill C-3. In a recent 
study, Craig Forcese and Lorne Waldman vividly illustrated the increased 
type of procedural fairness that could be included, partly based on inter-
views with special advocates in the U.K. and New Zealand. They argue that 
any special advocate system employed in Canada should model the special 
advocate system used by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Review 
Committee (SIRC), which involves security-cleared lawyers, and includes a 
number of safeguards, which, in fact, were not included later in Bill C-3.149
Their report specifically warned against implementation of a special advo-
cate system such as the one in the U.K. and in New Zealand.150 One of For-
cese and Waldman’s recommended safeguards included a requirement that 
any claim of secrecy of evidence be put to a balancing test that would re-
semble the test laid out in the Canada Evidence Act. Such a balancing test 
would require a judge to weigh “the public interest in disclosure against the 
public interest in non-disclosure and [the judge] is empowered to authorize 
forms and conditions of disclosure that reflect this balancing.”151 Before 
appointing a special advocate, Forcese and Waldman further suggested that 
a court should expressly find that no less-restrictive alternative is available 
to protect the information. Examples of less-restrictive alternatives include 
in camera hearings to have either both the detainee and counsel present or, 
under some circumstances, to have only the detainee’s counsel present.152
Forcese and Waldman do acknowledge that, in limited circums-
tances, there might not be a less-restrictive option available, and that it 
might be necessary to appoint a special advocate.153 In such a situation, they 
suggest that the special advocate should have specific functions, such as a 
duty to seek further disclosure of evidence—a procedure they again com-
pared to the Canada Evidence Act.154 Additionally, they argue that the spe-
bus/senate/Com-e/anti-e/rep-e/rep02feb07-e.htm.  
148 Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶ 1. 
149 Forcese & Waldman, supra note 27. 
150 Id. at ii–iii. 
151 Id. It is also notable that the Charkaoui Court pointed to the procedures under the Cana-
da Evidence Act as an example that less-restrictive means of protecting confidential informa-
tion were available. Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶¶ 77-79. 
152 Forcese & Waldman, supra note 27, at ii–iii. 
153 Id. at 61. 
154 Id. at 61–63. 
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cial advocate should be actively involved in the advocacy process, including 
cross-examinations and investigation into evidence that is not disclosed.155
Applying their reasoning to Bill C-3, and given the lack of an attorney-
client relationship between the special advocate and the detainee, as speci-
fied by Bill C-3, the government should be required to disclose all informa-
tion to the special advocate, and the special advocate should be allowed to 
question the detainee after reviewing all the evidence.156
Interestingly, in the recent MB decision of the House of Lords, Lord 
Hoffman argued that the government must be allowed to keep some infor-
mation confidential. He cited to the “Canadian procedure,” which had been 
previously noted with approval by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Chahal v. United Kingdom as acknowledging that some national security 
measures might justify the keeping of some information confidential.157
Lord Hoffman noted that the Canadian SIRC procedure was the basis for 
the special advocate system in the U.K. Interestingly, however, the SIRC 
system to which the Chahal court had earlier referred, was eliminated in 
immigration proceedings by the 2002 changes to the Canadian immigration 
legislation.158 The Supreme Court in Charkaoui also had described with 
approval the former SIRC procedure, as well as other instances in which 
Canada had used procedures less restrictive than the outright denial of 
access to evidence.159 Bill C-3 fails to adopt many of the procedural safe-
guards that had been applied in those other scenarios. Thus, it appears that 
safeguards are available, and have even been used to give greater protection 
to the rights of detainees in those cases in which evidence must be withheld 
for national security reasons. In failing to include mechanisms that are 
proven and tested even in Canada, Bill C-3 falls significantly short of the 
threshold for constitutionality established by the Supreme Court in its anal-
ysis under Section 1 of the Charter in Charkaoui.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is commonly said that you can judge a society by the way it treats 
its weakest members. When it comes to measuring Canada’s true commit-
ment to the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, individuals 
caught in the immigration system are our constitutional canaries: they stand 
on the outer limit of the boundaries of belonging to our community, nearly 
entirely disenfranchised from the political establishment. It is therefore not a 
155 Id. at 63–64. 
156 See id. at ii. 
157 MB, supra note 129, ¶¶ 51–55 (citing to Chahal v United Kingdom  23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
413 (1996)). 
158 Id. ¶ 54; Forcese & Waldman, supra note 27, at 10–15. 
159 Charkaoui, supra note 3, ¶¶ 70–77, 80–81. 
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surprise that many of the most important Canadian human rights decisions 
over the last several years, cases such as Baker, Suresh, and Mugesera, have 
involved the immigration and refugee process.160 Within that especially 
vulnerable population, persons detained pursuant to a security certificate 
because of alleged terrorist involvement have significantly less recourse to 
defend themselves than would citizens facing such suspicion. The treatment 
of persons detained pursuant to a security certificate will stand as the loud-
est and clearest statement that Canada truly is committed to judicial fair-
ness, and, more broadly, to human rights as fundamental to our society and 
culture. In the context of the so-called “Global War on Terror,” a genuine 
commitment to human rights will resonate well beyond our borders. At the 
international level, the global fight against terrorism has become the excuse 
of choice to justify any and all denials of human rights, a convenient fig leaf 
for many governments whose commitment to such rights is perhaps ques-
tionable in the first place.161 Canada to some extent serves as one of the 
barometers of what constitutes a legitimate reaction to the threat of terror-
ism. The balanced nature of our reaction will be assessed well beyond our 
borders.
160 See Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 
(Can.); Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 
SCC 1 (Can.); Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 
S.C.R. 100, 2005 SCC 40 (Can.). 
161 See, e.g., Robin Kirk, Colombia and the “War” on Terror: Rhetoric and Reality,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Mar. 2004, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/03/04/colomb79 
32.htm (suggesting that the Government of Colombia is using the War on Terror to justify 
changes in its own practices); Cathy Majtenyi, Report Says War on Terror Violating Human 
Rights in Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, NEWS VOA, Apr. 4, 2007, http://www.voanews.com/En
glish/archive/2007-04/2007-04-04-voa38.cfm (describing allegations of secret U.S. interro-
gations of  detainees in Ethiopia); Essential Background: Overview of Human Rights Issues 
in Pakistan, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Jan. 1, 2004, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2003/12/ 
31/pakist7008.htm (describing human-rights abuses in Pakistan, undertaken under the aus-
pices of the War on Terror). 
